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A. Varieties of Methodology in CCL
1. The contemporary field of comparative constitutional law dates to the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the diffusion of democratic constitutions across the globe. According to one influential map
of the field, there are five distinct methodologies—classificatory, contextual, historical,
universalist, and functional (Jackson 2012). These methodologies, as well as others that have
since been identified, often refer to the different types of inquiry pursued by the different legal,
political, and academic actors in the field (Hirschl 2018, 16). Some are typically used by the
constitution-drafters and constitutional courts that have driven the field’s renaissance and that are
principal consumers of CCL knowledge. Others are associated with the university and the
scholarly production of CCL knowledge. Before turning to the functional approach, it is helpful
to situate it in the broader landscape of CCL’s varieties of methodology.
1. Consumption-Side Varieties—Expressivist, Universalist, Functionalist
2. On the consumption side, three approaches to comparative law have emerged. “Expressivist”
judges and drafters have relatively little use for CCL since they view constitutions as the
expression of a nation (Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities’, 1269). Constitutions embody national
identity--distinctive historical, political, and cultural trajectories. At most, comparisons with
other jurisdictions can be “reflective” (Dixon) and illuminate what is distinctive about a
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particular constitutional order but they cannot and should not shape the direction taken by that
order.
3. By contrast, “universalist” judges and drafters situate their constitutions or parts of their
constitutions in the broader sweep of human society (Tushnet, ‘Some Reflections’, 69). What
other jurisdictions have to say on particular issues of constitutional law is relevant because if
enough of them share the same view, a moral commitment shared by the rest of human society
can be established, or at least an important and growing segment of human society. It is this
universalist use of CCL to which the “cherry-picking” critique (Gelter and Siems, 40) applies
most forcefully, since universalism requires a certain degree of consensus, either across the
entire globe, or among certain regions or other types of country groupings, and to cherry pick
undermines the assertion of consensus.
4. “Functionalist” judges and drafters are located somewhere in between (Tushnet, ‘Some
Reflections’, 72). There is enough commonality between the home jurisdiction and the foreign
jurisdiction(s) to use the constitutional law of the foreign jurisdiction(s) as a tool for pondering a
common problem of constitutional law. Whether the foreign solution is desirable, however, is to
be assessed based not on head counting (as for universalists) but on how well the judge or drafter
thinks it solves the problem—based on the needs and normative commitments of their particular
jurisdiction.
5. These different methodologies can be illustrated with examples from the jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), (universalist) Justice Kennedy
and (expressivist) Justice Scalia spared over the use of comparative law. The case involved the
issue of whether the death penalty for juveniles was contrary to the Eight Amendment’s
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held
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that it was, and, as part of the reasoning, cited to foreign law. He stated that the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which contains an express prohibition on the juvenile
death penalty, had been ratified by every country in the world with the exception of two (the
United States and Somalia) and that, after surveying national law and practice across the world,
only the United States continued to approve of the use of the juvenile death penalty. Justice
Kennedy thus concluded (578):
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the
instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime. .
. . The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation of our own conclusions.
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, scathingly dismissed Justice Kennedy’s use of
comparative law (624) : “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should
conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”
6. As for functionalist methodology, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) is a well-known illustration. There the issue of how to interpret American federalism
was addressed using the experience of a couple of other jurisdictions in dealing with the common
(functional) federalism problem of preserving local control at the same time as accommodating
the need for central authority. Justice Breyer’s functionalist methodology is discussed further
below.
3. Production-Side Varieties—Black-Letter, Historical, Contextual, Classificatory, Critical
7. A number of other methodologies are primarily associated with scholars working in the
universities. These methodological labels refer either to the types of material and techniques that
are used by scholars to compare the constitutional law of different jurisdictions or to certain
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academic purposes of knowledge-building that are less driven by the consumption needs of
courts and constitution drafters.
8. The types of material and techniques used by CCL are common to all legal scholarship—the
only difference being that CCL studies multiple jurisdictions as opposed to a single jurisdiction.
There can be black-letter scholarship, which looks to the text of constitutions, court judgments,
and scholarly treatises across the many jurisdictions. There can be historical analysis of the
emergence and development of constitutional law in two or more jurisdictions. There can be
contextual scholarship that looks at how constitutional law works in the practice of the societies
of two or more jurisdictions, taking into account the larger institutional, political, economic, and
social context of the law. Although the contextual label was initially developed to refer to
constitutional analysis that looks beyond black-letter sources, the field has since become so rich
that it is possible to identify many different strands. Replicating the methodologies of political
science, there is scholarship focused on a small number of cases that seeks to acquire and
leverage deep knowledge of a few jurisdictions (Hirschl, 245); there is also large-N scholarship
that uses statistical methods and that requires large data sets across many countries (Ginsburg
and Melton; Law and Versteeg). More in line with the disciplinary traditions of anthropology
and sociology, a number of studies investigate the practices and meanings of constitution law in
particular jurisdictions (Scheppele).
9. Production-side labels can also refer to types of scholarly purposes that are pursued in the
academy and that are somewhat removed from the constitutional questions posed by judicial and
political actors. Classificatory scholarship is designed to formulate categories of constitutions or
elements of constitutions, for instance “liberal” and “illiberal” constitutionalism or “abstract” and
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“concrete” constitutional review. Critical scholarship brings attention to the cultural biases of
CCL (Frankenberg) and the strategic and ideological uses of CCL knowledge (Kennedy).
4. Relationship Between Consumption-Side and Production-Side Varieties
10. The production and consumption labels can overlap in CCL scholarship. Critical producers
are skeptical of any type of CCL consumption. By contrast, the relative ease of black-letter
production also makes consumption (universalist and functionalist) relatively easy and possible.
Otherwise, however, production types do not easily map on to consumption types. Historical
approaches can buttress either expressivist, nationalist projects, as tends to be the case in
American scholarship, or universalist, cosmopolitan ones, as is often the case in Europe’s
integrating landscape. Contextual approaches that draw on the social sciences are vulnerable to
all of the debates in the social sciences on the validity of descriptive and causal inference (King,
Keohane and Verba; Brady and Collier). Therefore scholarly production in this vein does not
automatically lead to uptake in constitutional courts and constitutional drafting chambers.
B. Functional Approach
11. As already explained, the functional approach refers to one type of CCL consumption: the
legal actors that write and adjudicate constitutions turn to the constitutional law of other
jurisdictions to explore alternatives that can assist in devising a normatively desirable textual
provision or court judgment. What is considered desirable is defined not by reference to the
criterion of universality, which implies a moral consensus among all human society or a likeminded subset of human society. Rather, desirability is defined by reference to the metrics at
work within the specific jurisdiction in which the legal actor is situated.
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12. The typical steps are as follows. First, a problem that is addressed by a constitution or, more
often, a provision of a constitution or element of constitutional doctrine is identified. Second, the
constitutional text and judicial decisions of other jurisdictions concerning the problem are
canvassed. Third, the variety of constitutional law thus revealed is used as (i) a menu of options
and (ii) a technique for assessing how well those legal options have worked in the practice of the
different countries. Informed by this comparative experience, the constitution writer or
adjudicator decides on the best solution to the problem, based on normative criteria internal to
his or her jurisdiction.
1. U.S. Supreme Court and Printz v. United States
13. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz v. United States, mentioned earlier, is a well-known
example of the functional approach. The case involved a challenge to a federal gun-control law
that required local police—as opposed to federal officers—to conduct background checks on
prospective purchasers of handguns. The majority found that this federal “commandeering” of
state governments violated the U.S. Constitution’s system of dual sovereignty, vested in the
states and the federal government. Rather, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the federal law
would have to be written to give implementation to a free-standing federal bureaucracy. In
arriving at this conclusion, the majority did not rely principally on text, since the U.S.
Constitution is largely silent on the issue, but on the Federalist Papers and other evidence of the
original intent of the constitutional drafters, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior case law.
14. In his Printz dissent, Justice Breyer reached the opposite conclusion. Among the reasons he
offered was comparative constitutional law. He began by positing a common “function” or
“problem”: “the United States is not the only nation that seeks to reconcile the practical need for
a central authority with the democratic virtues of more local control.” (Printz, 967) In
6

canvassing other federal constitutions, Justice Breyer found that they provided for a legal option
that was analogous to commandeering (Printz, 977):
The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all
provide the constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many
of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central “federal” body.
He saw the foreign experience with this legal option to be favorable—based on the concern in
American federalism for state sovereignty and individual liberty. And therefore Justice Breyer
would have upheld the federal gun-control law.
15. Almost twenty years later, Justice Breyer took up the issue of the role of foreign and
international law in U.S. law in his book The Court and the World. There he gives this summary
of the functional approach (239-40):
As judges throughout the world undertake to fulfil their responsibilities of reviewing their
countries’ laws and regulations for constitutional validity, they have all found themselves
facing somewhat similar problems. And if someone with a job roughly like my own,
facing a legal problem roughly like the one confronting me, interpreting a document that
resembles the one I look to, has written a legal opinion about a similar matter, why not
read what that judge has said? I might learn from it, whether or not I end up agreeing
with it.
2. Australian High Court and McCloy v. New South Wales
16. As reflected by the earlier discussion, the academic debate on the appropriate uses of foreign
law in constitutional adjudication is highly developed in the American legal literature. However,
in the actual practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, the resort to foreign sources is quite limited.
By contrast, the Australian High Court cites frequently to foreign law in constitutional cases
(Saunders and Stone 37) and it often does so following a functional approach. For instance, in
McCloy v. New South Wales, 257 CLR 178 (2015), a majority of the Court borrowed
proportionality from Europe to assess a law restricting political donations. The law had been
7

challenged based on the Australian Constitution’s implied freedom of political communication.
The prior case law had established a test comprised of the following steps: (1) whether the law
effectively burdens this form of speech; (2) whether the law is legitimate, meaning compatible
with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government; and
(3) whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance that purpose.
17. The McCloy majority, to conduct the third step, adopted the European proportionality
framework of suitability, necessity, and balancing (between the importance of the purpose and
the restriction on the freedom). The rationale for the borrowing was not the universality of
proportionality across the world’s constitutional courts. Rather, the borrowing was driven by
proportionality’s utility as an analytical framework for addressing the common problem of
“evaluating legislation which effects a restriction on a right or freedom.” (McCloy, para. 74) The
advantages of proportionality, as articulated by the majority, were “transparency” for the
legislative branch (McCloy, para.74) and a “structured approach” for the courts that would
clarify the different elements of a reasonableness assessment and make value judgments explicit
(McCloy, paras. 77 and 78). In sum, the Australian High Court’s use of comparative law was
driven by what it concluded was a successful solution to the common functional problem of
assessing legislative burdens on rights—successfully based on the particulars and normative
commitments of Australian constitutional law.
3. South African Constitutional Court and AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative
Journalism NPC v. Minister of Justice and Correctional Services
18. The South African Constitutional Court is widely known for its use of foreign judgments in
its reasoning (Rautenbach 2013; Rautenbach 2020). Justice Ackerman, who served on the
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Constitutional Court during its first decade (1994-2004) has explained the Court’s approach to
comparative law in functionalist terms (183-184):
[F]oreign law is not in any sense binding on the court that refers to it. . . . . One may be
seeking information, guidance, stimulation, clarification or even enlightenment but never
authority binding on one’s own decision. One is doing no more than keeping the judicial
mind open to new ideas, problems, arguments, solutions, etc. . . . Recourse to foreign law
often helped me (at least) to identify the correct problem, or to identify it properly. . . . It
is also useful to see how foreign courts have solved the problem, what methodology has
been used to this end, what the competing considerations have been, and whether any
potential dangers were identified in the process.
19. One recent example of the Court’s functional use of CCL is AmaBhungane Centre for
Investigative Journalism NPC v. Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, 2021 SACLR
LEXIS 2. The Court was called upon to evaluate the constitutionality of South Africa’s
electronic surveillance law based on the constitutional right to privacy. The facts of the case
involved the interception by state authorities of a journalist’s communications. The Court found
numerous constitutional defects with the privacy guarantees in the law, including the absence of
a post-surveillance duty for the state to disclose to the subject of surveillance both the fact of the
surveillance and the legal basis for the surveillance. To support the need for post-surveillance
notification and the finding of unconstitutionality, the Court relied on the law of the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the European Court of Human Rights (paras. 46-47).
Why exactly, did this support the Court’s conclusion? The words of the Court (para. 46):
While internationally there is no consensus on when and how post-surveillance
notification is any absolutely necessary safeguard of the right to privacy, considerable
comparative practice supports that some form of notice is crucial to minimizing abuse.
20. Thus we see that the AmaBhungane court’s reliance on comparative law was not
universalist—the court acknowledged that there is no universal standard with respect to
notification. Rather, the experience with notification as a vehicle for protecting privacy in a
couple of jurisdictions with a similar right to privacy supported the Court’s independent and
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extensive reasoning advanced earlier in the judgment. That reasoning relied on constitutional
text, South Africa’s apartheid history, public reports on surveillance abuses by South Africa’s
police and intelligence services, and the logic relationship between notification and protecting
the right to privacy—given that notification would, in the event of illegal surveillance, allow
individuals to sue for a remedy and that the prospect of notification would serve to deter illegal
surveillance by state actors (paras. 23-28; 38-45).
4. Israeli Supreme Court and Eitan—Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli
Government
21. The Israeli Supreme Court makes extensive use of comparative law in constitutional
adjudication (Hirschl, ‘In Search of an Identity,’ 553). This has been justified in functionalist
terms by Aharon Barak, who served as a member of the Supreme Court for almost thirty years.
In his book The Judge in a Democracy he explains (197-98):
[D]ifferent democratic legal systems often encounter similar problems. Examining a
foreign solution may help a judge choose the best legal solution. . . .[Comparative law]
informs judges about the successes and failures that may result from adopting a particular
legal solution. . .Thus, comparative law acts as an experienced friend. Of course, there is
no obligation to refer to comparative law. Additionally, even when comparative law is
consulted, the final decision must always be local. The benefit of comparative law is in
expanding judicial thinking about the possible arguments, legal trends, and decisionmaking structures available.
22. A good illustration of the various ways that comparative law is employed, including the
functional method, is Eitan—Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government
(2014). This judgment involved an Israeli law on mandatory detention and residency centers for
undocumented migrants. It was the second of three Supreme Court judgments that struck down
successive versions of the law, and that ultimately led to a considerable reduction in the
detention period as well as the duration of stay in a residency center (Weill and Kritzman-Amir,
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61-62). The majority opinion divided the analysis of the alleged infringements of the rights to
liberty and dignity into two parts, the first of which dealt with the mandatory detention period
and the second of which dealt with the length of stay and conditions in the residency center.
Both parts employed a proportionality test to determine whether the burden on liberty was
permissible and both parts included a comprehensive comparative law overview to assist in the
proportionality determination. For purposes of this discussion, it is possible to focus on the use
of comparative law on first issue of the permissible detention period.
23. The majority opinion’s use of comparative law was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand,
the stated rationale rested on Justice Barak’s functional logic (para. 72):
By means of comparative law it is possible to broaden the constitutional horizons and
receive interpretive inspiration.. . . In a issue similar to this matter, which occupies many
countries throughout the world to find diverse solutions, it is not correct that we overlook
the comparative analysis.
On the other hand, the majority’s impressive survey of maximum detention periods in fifteen
like-minded jurisdictions (“western countries” and democracies) led to the conclusion that
Israel’s one-year detention period was exceptional compared with the shorter periods in the
majority of jurisdictions (para. 72):
[T]he maximum period of one year for the detainment of detention [sic] of the illegal
immigrants who cannot be deported on grounds that are not connected thereto is not
acceptable in most countries.
The majority was careful to rest its finding of disproportionality exclusively on Israeli
constitutional law (paras. 78-79). However, it is clear that the comparative analysis buttressed its
conclusion not because of the superiority of any particular foreign detention scheme, but because
the Israeli legislation was out of line with the solution adopted by the overwhelming majority of
peer jurisdictions, consistent with a universalist approach.
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24. The dissenting opinions also engaged with comparative law. Justice Hendel took issue with
the majority’s universalist characterization of the dominant approach in other jurisdictions,
arguing that a closer look led to a more mixed finding, with detention periods often exceeding
one year (para. 4). Justice Amit argued in favor of focusing on the law of a more limited set of
jurisdictions (Australia, Greece Malta and Italy), which had adopted longer detention periods and
which, in his view, truly shared the same functional problem as Israel--of being front-line
countries for migration (para. 15). And Chief Justice Grunis, in arguing against the remedy
chosen by the majority (repeal of the one-year legal provision) and in favor of an alternative
remedy (a reasonable interpretation that shortened the detention period) buttressed his point with
an example taken from the U.S. Supreme Court—Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001),
which rather than holding the legal provision on indefinite detention unconstitutional, interpreted
it to include a presumption of release after six months (para. 52). In sum, the Eitan case affords
a good illustration of how the Israeli Supreme Court engages with CCL, either to determine a
universalist consensus position among like-minded countries, or to afford helpful alternatives
and sources of inspiration for functional problems of constitutional law, variously defined.
5. Functional Approach’s Black-Letter Bias
25. Functionalist methodology mostly refers to one type of knowledge consumption. However,
as revealed by the examples of constitutional adjudication discussed above, this methodology is
also associated with a particular type of knowledge production. That is, black-letter methodology
that focus on the text of the law, and the text of the law that is directly on point for the problem
at hand. In all of the constitutional cases surveyed above, the foreign law cited was the text of
legislation and decisions of other constitutional courts.
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26. The black-letter bias of the functional approach has given rise to criticism in the academy.
To explore this issue, it is helpful to return to Printz. Some of the critical reaction to Justice
Breyer’s use of comparative law focused not on his assumption that foreign law held
functionalist relevance for a question of U.S. constitutional law, but on the way he went about
investigating the foreign law. In a widely cited piece, the legal scholar Daniel Halberstam
argued that Breyer’s analysis of commandeering law was too cursory. Halberstam argued that it
was necessary to situate constitutional doctrine on commandeering within the broader
institutional and legal context of federalism in each of the jurisdictions considered. He pointed to
a number of constitutional rules that existed in the European Union and Germany—but not the
United States—that significantly constrain the powers of the central level, to the benefit of the
state level. The upshot was that the U.S. constitutional rule prohibiting commandeering might,
overall, achieve the same federalism effect as a constitutional rule permitting commandeering—
but embedded in a broad array of institutional arrangements that check federal powers, as in the
European Union and Germany.
27. More generally speaking, Halberstam’s argument was that black-letter production of
comparative knowledge is not enough—to understand the effect of any given constitutional rule
on the desired outcome, the institutional and legal context matters. This emphasis on
understanding the entire institutional and legal context of doctrinal rules before coming to any
conclusion on questions of constitutional design and interpretation is what has been called
“contextualism” (Tushnet, ‘Some Reflections’, 67) and “contextualized functionalism” (Jackson,
‘Methodological Challenges’, 326). It is open to the use of the social scientific methods
discussed earlier in this entry.
C. Comparative Law’s Functional Method
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28. There has been a tendency to conflate the functional approach of constitutional courts and the
legal scholarship designed to address their functional inquiries with the functional method in the
broader discipline of comparative law (Samuel and Legrand, 373). However, there is a critical
difference between CCL and comparative law broadly speaking. What is billed “functionalist”
legal and scholarly output in the field of CCL is actually formalist from the perspective of
comparative law (Bignami). That is, the law included in CCL projects is limited to the law that
bears the “constitutional” label: the written law called “constitution”; the “constitutional” court
with the power to adjudicate the constitution; the scholarly treatise on “constitutional” law. The
small exception to this reliance on formal constitutional labels is scholarship on jurisdictions
without written constitutions or without courts without responsibility for judicial review based on
their constitutions (Gardbaum). The fact of the matter, however, is that since the end of the Cold
War, the number of such jurisdictions has become vanishingly small. Therefore, the vast
majority of comparative studies can (and do) look no further than the constitutional labels to
determine what to compare in the countries of interest.
29. CCL’s formalist approach is problematic because it contains a culturally biased ontology of
law and legal systems. It presumes that the supreme law on core issues of constitutional law such
as government organization and fundamental rights is to be found in the text of the “constitution”
and the adjudication of the “constitutional” court. But depending on the jurisdiction, that might
very well not be the case. What are, formally speaking, “constitutional” sources of law might, in
a foreign jurisdiction with a different ontology of law and legal system, be sidelined by other
sources and legal actors that, in the theory and practice of that legal system, exercise supreme
legal authority.
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30. Comparative law’s functional method (Zweigert and Kötz) was developed originally to
overcome this type of cultural bias. In the case of Ernst Rabel, the widely accepted originator of
the method, the cultural bias was the doctrinal constructs developed in German Pandectist
scholarship, and the need for overcoming the bias was driven by new political and business
realities of the post-WWI period (Resta). Like the use of comparative law in the constitutional
jurisprudence reviewed above, the functional method contain a problem-solution structure. That,
however, is where the similarity begins and ends. In the functional method, the problem is
formulated in such a way that it can, in theory, be solved by any part of a legal system, not a
single domain of the system such as constitutional law. To take this agnostic approach as to
which part of the legal system is triggered by an issue such as federalism or free speech and
therefore should be compared, it is necessary to formulate the problem in a particular fashion.
The problem cannot be permeated by doctrinal and institutional constructs since those are likely
to reflect the legal particularities of one jurisdiction and therefore to be ill-suited to a
comparative study that, by definition, seeks to cover multiple jurisdictions. Rather, an effort is
made to identify a common social problem, rooted in the practices and needs of many, if not
most, human societies. The problem can be formulated at different levels of abstraction. In
large group projects, the so-called factual method (Schlesinger; Bussani and Mattei) is common:
a series of fact-based hypotheticals are formulated, similar to what one might find in a (common
law) case and the national reporters are asked to analyze how such facts would be handled in
their jurisdictions.
31. Based on the common social problem, the various legal solutions are identified. Many times
they are not handled by the same legal doctrines or in the same branch of law in the jurisdictions
under consideration. But since they address the same problem, they are called functional
15

equivalents. To illustrate with a couple of problems and country examples: the problem of motor
vehicle accidents is handled by the functional equivalents of tort law (the United States) and
social insurance law (Germany); the problem of ascertaining ownership of land is handled by the
functional equivalents of official land registries (Italy) and title insurance (the United States).
Thus revealed, the various legal solutions can be compared and the various utilitarian projects of
comparative law, including unification and borrowing, can be accomplished.
32. Turning to constitutional law, it is possible to identify a number of substantive, social
problems that are commonly addressed by constitutions and constitutional courts. These involve
the structure of government and the individual rights that can be invoked against government.
Importantly, constitutional law also is defined as the highest law that governs these areas of
social and political life and, as such, it is the supreme law that can be invoked in court, above all
other sources of law. Based on this functional definition of the domain of constitutional law, it is
possible to illustrate the method with two concrete examples.
1. Individual Rights Against Market Regulation—Constitutional Law in Germany and
Administrative Law in the United States and France
33. The first illustration is taken from the common functional problem of individual rights
against government regulation of markets (Bignami, 455-69). In most jurisdictions, there are
complex regulatory schemes, involving both parliamentary law and administrative action,
designed to regulate the economy and protect against social harms such as environmental
pollution and injury to consumers. These schemes generally burden market actors and their
market rights, such as their freedom to engage in various types of business practices. In the
United States, the highest law in this domain is found in sources of administrative law, not
constitutional law, because market rights largely have been read out of the Constitution in the
16

post-New Deal era. In France, the highest law is found in the adjudication and advisory powers
of the supreme administrative court (Council of State) because the Constitutional Council’s remit
continues to be limited in light of the traditional republican suspicion of gouvernement des juges.
Only in Germany is the highest law to found in constitutional law, namely the Basic Law as it
has been interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court. This variation is important to
appreciate for comparative investigations concerned with market rights because research only on
what is formally identified as constitutional law, or, for that matter, only on what is formally
identified as administrative law, would paint a highly misleading picture of the law in the three
jurisdictions.
2. Right to Equality Based on Sex—Islamic Law in Jordan
34. The second example of the functional method is drawn from the problem of guaranteeing the
right to equality based on sex. In countries that belong to the Islamic law tradition, it is
necessary to consider not only the formal constitutional law. Rather, it is also necessary to delve
into family and inheritance law, which are generally governed by Islamic law.
35. The example of Jordan illustrates why an inquiry into the right to sex equality cannot only
look at constitutional law but must also scrutinize (Islamic) family and inheritance law. Jordan’s
Constitution guarantees the general right of equality (Article 6). Jordan also has a constitutional
court with the power to review laws and regulations for compliance with the Constitution
(Nasrawin). At the same time, personal status matters involving Muslims, i.e. family and
inheritance law, are entrusted to the “sole jurisdiction of the Sharia courts.” (Constitution, Article
103(2)) Although the constitutional court has the power to take references from the Court of
Cassation (which has jurisdiction over the civil courts), it does not appear that the same applies
to the Sharia courts and there have certainly been no such constitutional cases thus far.
17

Therefore the supreme law on family and inheritance matters is to be found in the decisional law
of the Sharia courts and their legal sources—a mixture of the Jordanian Personal Status Code
(inspired by Islamic law) and the traditional sources of Islamic law.
36. Examination of this functional constitutional law (Islamic law) reveals a number of contrasts
with the formal constitutional text. For instance, as part of the wife’s duty of obedience, she has
an obligation to follow her husband wherever he decides to go, provided he ensures her safety.
Under Article 62 of the Personal Status Code, if the wife refuses to move with her husband, she
is considered disobedient (nashez) and loses the right to financial maintenance. Not only does
this discriminate based on sex, but it is discrimination with respect to an essential freedom that is
generally guaranteed by states and that is indeed contained in Article 9 of the Jordanian
Constitution—the freedom of movement and residence. Further, for those constitutional
traditions that insist on state action for there to be constitutional rights, there is plenty here: the
mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction of Sharia courts, combined with Islamic apostasy law
(Hamoudi, 309), makes this not a matter of a woman’s religious choice but a state-backed form
of discrimination and obstacle to freedom of (non-) movement.
37. In short, a comparative constitutional analysis of the right to sex equality that includes
Islamic jurisdictions would fundamentally misrepresent the law of such jurisdictions if it stuck to
the formal constitutional law. Rather, a functional method that recognizes that, especially on
family and inheritance matters, Islamic legal sources and legal actors take precedence is a more
accurate rendition of the supreme law in this substantive nook of constitutional law.
D. Conclusion
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38. There is no doubt that CCL’s functional approach will remain a fruitful source of inspiration
for constitutional courts and constitution drafters. The possibilities of cross-jurisdictional
borrowing, illustrated above with judicial decisions from South Africa, Israel, Australia, and the
United States, will continue to fuel scholarship in the academy as well as think tanks and other
venues. At the same time, by remaining exclusively in the formal realm of constitutional law, the
field of CCL risks neglecting what, functionally speaking, is constitutional law in many of the
world’s jurisdictions.
39. Comparative law’s functional method draws out the role of other sources of law, besides
formal constitutions, and other legal actors, besides the writers, adjudicators, and legal scholars
of constitutions, in guaranteeing the liberal rights and democratic principles of the contemporary
constitutional template. In the examples explored above, these were administrative law and
courts and Sharia law and courts. This is a time when the power and authority of constitutional
courts and their constitutions have revealed themselves to be quite precarious in many parts of
the world. Appealing to the broader set of legal actors that populate the world’s jurisdictions and
that make and adjudicate the supreme law of those jurisdictions is a useful addition to the
disciplinary agenda of CCL.
Select Bibliography
Ackermann, LWH, ‘Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa: A Response to Sir Basil
Markesinis and Jorg Fedtke’ (2005-2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 169.
Bignami, F, ‘Formal versus Functional Method in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2016) 53
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 442.
Brady, HE, and Collier, D (eds), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards,
2nd ed. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2010).
Breyer, S, The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities (Alfred A.
Knopf 2015).

19

Bussani, M, and Mattei, U, ‘The Common Core Approach to European Private Law’ (1997-98) 3
Columbia Journal of European Law 339.
Dixon, R, ‘A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison’ (2008) 56 American Journal of
Comparative Law 947.
Frankenberg, G, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard
International Law Journal 211.
Gardbaum, S, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (CUP
2012).
Gelter, M, and Siems, M, ‘Citations to Foreign Courts—Illegitimate and Superfluous, or
Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe’ (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 35.
Ginsburg, T, and Melton, J, ‘Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?
Amendment Culture and the Challenge of Measuring Amendment Difficulty’ (2015) 13
International Journal of Constitutional Law 686.
Graziadei, M, ‘The functionalist heritage’ in Legrand, P and Munday, R (eds), Comparative
Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP 2003) 100.
Groppi, T, and Marie-Claire, P (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges
(Hart Publishing 2013).
Halberstam, D, ‘Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering,’ in Nicolaidis, K and
Howse, R (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the US and the EU
(OUP 2001) 213.
Hamoudi, HA, Islamic Law in a Nutshell (West Academic Publishing 2020).
Hirschl, R, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP
2014).
Hirschl, R, ‘In Search of an Identity: Voluntary Foreign Citations in Discordant Constitutional
Settings,’ (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 547.
Hirschl, R, ‘Comparative Methodologies,” in Masterman, R and Schütze, R The Cambridge
Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law (CUP 2018) 11.
Jackson, VC, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies’ in Rosenfeld, M and Sajó, A,
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 54.
Jackson, VC, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (OUP 2010).
Jackson, VC, ‘Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2010) 288 Penn
State International Law Review 319.
Kennedy, D, ‘Political ideology and comparative law’ in Bussani, M and Mattei, U, (eds), The
Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 35.
20

King, G, Keohane, R and Verba, S, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton University Press 1994).
Law, DS, and Versteeg, M, ‘Sham Constitutions’ (2013) 101 California Law Review 863.
Michaels, R, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Reimann, M and Zimmermann, R
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (OUP 2019) 345.
Nasrawin, L, ‘Protecting Human Rights Through Constitutional Adjudication—Jordan as a Case
Study’ (2016) 25 Digest of Middle East Studies 264.
Rautenbach, C, ‘South Africa: Teaching an ‘Old Dog’ New Tricks? An Emprical Study of the
Use of Foreign Precedents by the South African Constitutional Court (1995-2010)’ in Groppi, T
and Ponthoreau, M-C, (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (Hart
Publishing 2013) 185.
Rautenbach, C, ‘The Influence of Foreign Judgments on the Development of Post-Apartheid
Constitutional Law in South Africa: Judicial Law-Making in Action?’ (2020) 7 Journal of
International and Comparative Law 99.
Resta, G, ‘Les lutes de clocher en droit compare’ (2017) 62 McGill Law Journal 1153.
Samuel, G and Legrand, P, ‘A Conversation on Comparative Law’ (2020) 15 Journal of
Comparative Law 371.
Saunders, C and Stone, A, ‘Reference to Foreign Precedents by the Australian High Court: A
Matter of Method’ in Groppi, T and Ponthoreau, M-C, (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by
Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing 2013) 11.
Schelsinger, RB, ‘Introduction’ in Schlesinger, RB, (ed.), Formation of Contracts: A Study of the
Common Core of Legal Systems, vol.1 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1968) 1.
Scheppele, KL, ‘Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction’ (2004) Law & Society Review
389-406.
Tushnet, M, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal
1225.
Tushnet, M, ‘Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in Choudhry, S,
(ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP 2006) 67.
Weill, R and Kritzman-Amir, T, ‘Between Institutional Survival and Human Rights Protection:
Adjudicating Landmark Cases of African Undocumented Entrants in Israel in Comparative and
International Perspective’ (2019) 41 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 43.
Zweigert, K and Kötz, H, Introduction to Comparative Law, Weir, T (trans.), 3rd ed. (OUP
1998).
Select Cases
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (US)
21

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (US)
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (US)
Eitan--Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government (Sept. 22, 2014) (Isr.),
unofficial English translation available at: www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=54e607184
McCloy v. New South Wales, 257 CLR 178 (2015) (Austl)
AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC v. Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services, 2021 SACLR LEXIS 2 (S Afr.)

22

